Abstract
This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. Bounds on the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are also given. In particular, we show that the max cut game always admits a strong equilibrium and the strong price of anarchy is 2/3. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Gourvès, L., & Monnot, J. (2009). On strong equilibria in the max cut game. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5929 LNCS, pp. 608–615). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_62
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