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Partially-specified large games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (2005) 3828 LNCS 3-13
DOI: 10.1007/11600930_2
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Abstract

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.

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APA

Kalai, E. (2005). Partially-specified large games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3828 LNCS, pp. 3–13). https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_2

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