Abstract
Leitgeb (2005) proposes a new approach to semantic paradoxes, based upon a direct definition of the set of grounded sentences in terms of dependence upon non-semantic state of affairs. In the present paper, we account for the extensional disagreement between this dependence approach and more familiar alethic approaches. In order to do so, we study the behavior of dependence jumps and alethic jumps, and provide an equivalence result for the two approaches.
Author supplied keywords
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Bonnay, D., & Vugt, F. T. van. (2015). Groundedness, Truth and Dependence. In Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science (Vol. 36, pp. 355–368). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_18
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
