Beyond Gibbard and Satterthwaite: Voting Manipulation Games

  • Slinko A
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Abstract

The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators, who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. However, when a given preference profile admits several such manipulators, voting becomes a game...

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Slinko, A. (2019). Beyond Gibbard and Satterthwaite: Voting Manipulation Games (pp. 131–138). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_19

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