Historiography as a hypothetico-deductive science: A criticism of methodological historism

Abstract

I have known Alan Musgrave for a long time, both as a friend and as a partner in discussion. From reading his works, and from conversations with him, I have learned more than my contribution to this volume could possibly show. Therefore, I would like to express my deeply felt gratitude to him at this point. For two hundred years or more we have been faced with the thesis that there is a radical difference between historiography and the natural sciences. It is claimed that the methodology which is valid for historical research is, in general, completely different from scientific method. In particular, causal laws play no role in historical narrativeshistoricity and causal regularity are incompatible. I call this thesis methodological historism.1 I shall try to show that historism is not true and even that the representatives of historism themselves can be taken as the chief witnesses for my view, against their intentions, of course. First I shall say something about research programmes and problem-situations. Then I shall make some remarks about the research programmes of historism and of naturalism. Next I shall characterise methodological historism and the aim of historiography. Then I shall analyse the three main questions of Droysen, a prominent representative of historism, and his answers to these questions. Next I shall examine the relationship between sources and facts. And finally I shall criticise narrativism. © 2006 Springer.