Finite Extensive Form Games

  • Peters H
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Abstract

Most games derived from economic or political situations have in common with most parlor games (like card games and board games) that they are not ‘one-shot’: players move sequentially, and one and the same player may move more often than once. Such games are best described by drawing a decision tree which tells us whose move it is and what a player’s information is when that player has to make a move.

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Peters, H. (2015). Finite Extensive Form Games (pp. 51–69). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_4

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