MDPL is a logic style claiming to provide resistance against Differential Side Channel Analysis on power consumption measurements. In this paper we show that the power consumption of a non-linear MDPL gate can be reliably exploited to determine signal values and hence secret data, if the random masks have a slight bias. We present an attack methodology and a case study on how to infer secret key bits of an MDPL secured AES-ASIC in practice by attacking a single MDPL AND gate in a VLSI circuit. Our attack is not based on frequently made assumptions on circuit "anomalies", but on the per definition unbalanced routing, realistic PRNG biases, and knowledge of the circuit layout. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Gierlichs, B. (2007). DPA-resistance without routing constraints? - A cautionary note about MDPL security. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4727 LNCS, pp. 107–120). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_8
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