Abstract
We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures. © Springer-Verlag 2003.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Agrawal, D., Archambeault, B., Rao, J. R., & Rohatgi, P. (2003). The em Side-Channel(s). Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2523, 29–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
