In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an additive function over the items. An auction with budget constraints is a common special case where bidders generally have additive valuations, yet they have a limit on their maximal valuation. Auctions with budget constraints were analyzed by Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan [11], as part of a wider class of auctions, where they have shown that maximizing the revenue is NP-hard, and presented a greedy 2-approximation algorithm. In this paper we present exact and approximate algorithms for auctions with budget constraints. We present a randomized algorithm with an approximation ratio of e/e-1 ≈ 1.582, which can be derandomized. We analyze the special case where all bidders have the same budget constraint, and show an algorithm whose approximation ratio is between 1.3837 and 1.3951. We also present an FPTAS for the case of a constant number of bidders. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004.
CITATION STYLE
Andelman, N., & Mansour, Y. (2004). Auctions with budget constraints. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 3111, 26–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27810-8_4
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