Abstract
We present the formalization and verification of a recent cryptographic protocol for certified email. Relying on a tool for automatic protocol analysis, we establish the key security properties of the protocol. This case study explores the use of general correspondence assertions in automatic proofs, and aims to demonstrate the considerable power of the tool and its applicability to non-trivial, interesting protocols. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Abadi, M., & Blanchet, B. (2003). Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2694, 316–335. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44898-5_17
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
