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Deriving the complete knowledge of participants in cryptographic protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (1992) 576 LNCS 24-43
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-46766-1_2
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Abstract

This paper shows how to derive a representation of the participants’ knowledge in a cryptographic protocol. The modelization is based on the assumption that the underlying cryptographic system is perfect and is an extension of the “Hidden Automorphism Model” introduced by Merritt. It can be used to establish the security of the protocols.

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Toussaint, M. J. (1992). Deriving the complete knowledge of participants in cryptographic protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 576 LNCS, pp. 24–43). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_2

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