Leibniz on the efficacy and economy of divine grace

Abstract

The problem of the efficacy and distribution of God’s grace was one of the main theological issues with which Leibniz dealt throughout his works. In this respect, regardless of any consideration about Leibniz’s actual and sincere commitment to the theological doctrines of his time, it seems undeniable that he spared no effort in his attempt to solve this question. From his early Confessio philosophi (1672-3), Leibniz linked the metaphysical problem of evil with the following theological concern: if God is fair and the happiness of all his creatures pleases him, why is he so unequal with the distribution of his grace? Why doesn’t he make everyone happy? Why does he condemn so many? If the distinction between the saved and the condemned is made only by grace, what’s the point of reward and punishment? When dealing with these issues, Leibniz’s main concern was to rule out any sort of despotism or arbitrariness in God’s actions and to defend him from the charge of being the author of sin and damnation. As he states in De libertate creaturae rationalis (1686), “[…] there must be a reason why God gives the grace required for salvation to one and not to another, thus permitting the latter to be damned”.