Family control and corporate innovation in stakeholder-oriented corporate governance

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of family control on corporate innovation activity in publicly traded firms in Japan under stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. In a sample of 14,991 firm-year observations in publicly traded firms in Japan during the period 2007 to 2016, we tested whether family owners or board members are enhancing research and development investments. While theoretical perspectives of principal-principal conflicts generally assume a negative relationship between family control and research and development intensity, we find a positive relationship, which supports the stewardship theory perspective. Additionally, we find that main bank ownership positively moderates the relationship between family control and research and development, suggesting that the main bank could affect the decision-making of family board members in the long-term. This result is supported by the close relationships between the main bank and client firms. Furthermore, our study reveals that the shareholder orientation of foreign shareholders suppresses family board members’ long-term orientation. We conclude that the exploitation presumed by principal-principal conflict perspectives has not been thoroughly investigated in Japan’s stakeholder-oriented corporate governance system.