The rapid digitalization of power systems involves enhanced interconnectivity, intelligence, and cost-efficiency across all components. In the era of Industry 5.0, the criticality of energy supply makes power systems prime targets for attacks, highlighting the need for the creation and evaluation of solutions against cyber-physical threats. Testbeds have emerged as essential tools for these purposes by representing real-world power systems in controlled environments and simulating cyber-physical attack-defense experiments. This paper introduces a Cyber-Physical Security (CPS) testbed rooted in the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) and developed adversary setup within the National Smart Grid Laboratory at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. By adhering to the SGAM framework, this study delves into the classification and assessment of threats within the structure of the CPS testbed, examining vulnerabilities at distinct structural levels. Significantly, the strategic placement of the adversary setup within these levels enables a comprehensive evaluation of cyber-physical vulnerabilities in simulated systems, thereby facilitating the assessment of protective measures. Furthermore, this research presents case studies using three data sources as an aggregated dynamic power system model simulated in the real-time digital simulator OPAL-RT, real power grid, and playback of previously recorded data frames using virtual phasor measurement units functionality. The focus of this work is on the analysis of the five most common cyberattacks on power systems, such as passive and active reconnaissance, interruption in communication, TCP packet injection, and men-in-the-middle attacks utilizing the C37.118.2-2011 protocol. The results of the case studies illustrate the framework for the adversary setup and provide proof-of-concept attack scenarios for evaluation purposes. As part of future work, we intend to expand upon this research with a defender setup and implement more sophisticated, stealthy attacks.
CITATION STYLE
Mishchenko, D., Oleinikova, I., Erdodi, L., & Pokhrel, B. R. (2024). Multidomain Cyber-Physical Testbed for Power System Vulnerability Assessment. IEEE Access, 12, 38135–38149. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3375401
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