Abstract
In this paper we present an attack on a reduced round version of Crypton. The attack is based on the dedicated Square attack. We explain why the attack also works on Crypton and prove that the entire 256-bit user key for 6 rounds of Crypton can be recovered with a complexity of 256encryptions, whereas for Square 272encryptions are required to recover the 128-bit user key.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
D’Halluin, C., Bijnens, G., Rijmen, V., & Preneel, B. (1999). Attack on six rounds of CRYPTON. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1636, pp. 46–59). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48519-8_4
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
