DOES THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BUDGET REALIZATION AFFECT INCUMBENTS' VOTES? (STUDY IN INDONESIA LOCAL ELECTION)

Abstract

Purpose: The objectives of this study are: (a) to examine the association between political budget and incumbents' regional head votes, (b) to examine the moderating effect of political competition in the association between political budget with incumbents' regional head votes. Theoretical framework: This article examines whether social assistance budget is associated with incumbents' votes in Indonesia’s local elections. Design/methodology/approach: The samples are 212 regencies and cities in Indonesia that conducted local electionsin which the incumbent regents or mayors were taking part. Hypotheses are tested using moderated regression analysis (MRA). Findings: The result found that social assistance budget directly affects the incumbent votes in the local elections. Research, Practical & Social implications: This study which examines the effect of the political budget on incumbents' votes. Local elections cannot avoid candidates' rivalry, thus also examined its role when interacting with social assistance budgets. Originality/value: Political competition occurs; its interaction with social assistance budgets negatively affects the incumbents' votes.