Without the use of computational assumptions, unconditionally secure oblivious transfer (OT) is impossible in the standard model where the parties are using a clear channel. Such impossibilities can be overcome by using a noisy channel. Recently, Palmieri and Pereira proposed a protocol based on random channel delays only. Their scheme is secure in the semi-honest model, but not in the general malicious model. In this paper we study oblivious transfer in the same setting but we improve the result to obtain a fully secure protocol in the malicious model. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Cheong, K. Y., & Miyaji, A. (2011). Unconditionally secure oblivious transfer based on channel delays. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7043 LNCS, pp. 112–120). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25243-3_9
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.