Information leakage is a major concern in modern day ITsecurity. In fact, a malicious user is often able to extract information about private values from the computation performed on the devices. In specific settings, such as RFID, where a low computational complexity is required, it is hard to apply standard techniques to achieve resilience against this kind of attacks. In this paper, we present a framework to make cryptographic primitives based on large finite fields robust against information leakage with a bounded computational cost. The approach makes use of the inner product extractor and guarantees security in the presence of leakage in a widely accepted model. Furthermore, we show how to apply the proposed techniques to the authentication protocol Lapin, and we compare it to existing solutions.
CITATION STYLE
Andrychowicz, M., Masny, D., & Persichetti, E. (2015). Leakage-resilient cryptography over large finite fields: Theory and practice. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9092, pp. 655–674). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_32
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