Abstract
This paper reports on a security analysis of the IEEE 1588 standard, a.k.a. Precise Time Protocol (PTP). We show that attackers can use the protocol to (a) incorrectly resynchronize clocks, (b) rearrange or disrupt the hierarchy of PTP clocks, (c) bring the protocol participants into an inconsistent state, or (d) deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems. We also propose countermeasures for the identified attacks.
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CITATION STYLE
Tsang, J., & Beznosov, K. (2006). A security analysis of the precise time protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4307 LNCS, pp. 50–59). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_4
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