Comment on ‘Top Management Compensation and the Structure of the Board of Directors in Commercial Banks’

Abstract

We examine the relationship between top management compensation and the structure of the board of directors for a sample of commercial banks. We find that boards with more reputable outside directors compensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives (stock and stock options) than with cash (salary and bonus). We also find a significant positive correlation between the future performance of our sample banks and the proportion of their managers' compensation in the form of long-term incentives. Taken together, these results suggest that boards with highly reputed outside directors are more effective in providing managers with the appropriate incentives and thus ensuring better future firm performance. Another indication of the effectiveness of these boards is our finding that they compensate managers more heavily with long-term incentives (instead of cash) when these managers are more entrenched. We also find very little evidence of mutually beneficial back-scratching or collusion between outside directors and senior managers when setting management compensation. But boards with long-serving outside directors are less effective in creating appropriate management incentives.