Abstract
Proof-carrying code (PCC)is a framework for ensuring that untrusted programs are safe to install and execute. When using PCC, untrusted programs are required to contain a proof that allows the program text to be checked efficiently for safe behavior. In this paper, we lay the foundation for a potential engineering improvement to PCC. Specifically, we present a practical approach to using temporal logic to specify security policies in such a way that a PCC system can enforce them.
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CITATION STYLE
Bernard, A., & Lee, P. (2002). Temporal logic for proof-carrying code. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2392, pp. 31–46). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45620-1_3
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