Bribery, hold-up, and bureaucratic structure

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Abstract

We consider infrastructure provision by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but also cares for domestic welfare. Bureaucrats bargain with the investor over price and (potentially) bribes, both before the investment is sunk and afterwards, using the threat of expropriation. We show that domestic welfare may be greater in equilibria with bribery than in equilibria without. We specify conditions under which changes in the degree of bureaucratic centralization or of bureaucratic care have a positive, negative, or nonmonotonic effect on domestic welfare. The impact of centralization on domestic welfare is mediated through the level of bureaucratic care.

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APA

Bennett, J., & Rablen, M. D. (2021). Bribery, hold-up, and bureaucratic structure. Economic Inquiry, 59(3), 880–903. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12985

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