A Place for James J. Gibson

Abstract

We first contextualize Gibson's views within the broader space of theories about perception. We do this to illustrate how Gibson's perspective, more so than many others, is most intimately connected with place. For, unlike many dualists, and those drawing on inferential theory, Gibson's foundational claim is that place is directly perceived. As such, one's experience of place is not representational in nature. Phenomenologically, there is no translation of sensory input when one experiences place. Then, to make our case for how the Gibsonian perspective can be conceptualized as a theory of place, we describe the fundamental concepts of direct perception and affordances. Although Gibson did not specify what would be meant by a place, his theory of perception inextricably links an organism to the environment in which it interacts. From this, we then provide a Gibsonian perspective on place. We conclude by linking Gibsonian theory to a subset of philosophical concepts via current ideas in Cognitive Science. Our purpose here is not to provide a definitive conclusion as to how Gibsonian ideas align with these concepts. Rather, we hope to plant the seeds for further exploration of the concepts of meaning and purpose, their context in psychological theory, and how they may bridge the gap between psychology and ecology and a broader interdisciplinary theory of place.