Predicate-based authenticated key exchange resilient to ephemeral key leakage

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Abstract

We provide the first eCK security model for predicate-based authenticated key exchange (AKE) to guarantee resistance to leakage of ephemeral secret keys. We also propose an two-pass attribute-based AKE protocol secure in the proposed predicate-based eCK security model based on a attribute-based encryption. The proposed protocol has advantages in security against leakage of ephemeral secret keys and the round complexity compared to the previous predicate-based AKE protocol. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

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Fujioka, A., Suzuki, K., & Yoneyama, K. (2011). Predicate-based authenticated key exchange resilient to ephemeral key leakage. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6513 LNCS, pp. 15–30). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17955-6_2

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