When do envy-free allocations exist?

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Abstract

We consider a fair division setting in which m indivisible items are to be allocated among n agents, where the agents have additive utilities and the agents' utilities for individual items are independently sampled from a distribution. Previous work has shown that an envy-free allocation is likely to exist when m = ?(nlog n) but not when m = n+o(n), and left open the question of determining where the phase transition from non-existence to existence occurs. We show that, surprisingly, there is in fact no universal point of transition-instead, the transition is governed by the divisibility relation between m and n. On the one hand, if m is divisible by n, an envy-free allocation exists with high probability as long as m = 2n. On the other hand, if m is not “almost” divisible by n, an envy-free allocation is unlikely to exist even when m = T(nlog n/log log n).

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APA

Manurangsi, P., & Suksompong, W. (2019). When do envy-free allocations exist? In 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (pp. 2109–2116). AAAI Press. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012109

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