The scatter-gather technique is a commonly implemented approach to prevent cache-based timing attacks. In this paper we show that scatter-gather is not constant time. We implement a cache timing attack against the scatter-gather implementation used in the modular exponentiation routine in OpenSSL version 1.0.2f. Our attack exploits cache-bank conflicts on the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture. We have tested the attack on an Intel Xeon E5-2430 processor. For 4096-bit RSA our attack can fully recover the private key after observing 16,000 decryptions.
CITATION STYLE
Yarom, Y., Genkin, D., & Heninger, N. (2016). Cachebleed: A timing attack on OpenSSL constant time RSA. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9813 LNCS, pp. 346–367). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_17
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.