Affective (Dis)Embodiment in Nonnative Language

Abstract

There are two main currents of thought concerning how concepts are represented in our brain. In the disembodied view, concepts are abstract entities; hence our multimodal experiences in the outside world have no impact on their representation. In the embodied view, concepts are dynamically modulated as a result of our experiences and interactions in the world. In this chapter, I discuss the hypothesis raised by Pavlenko (Emotions and Multilingualism, New York, 2005; Int J Psychol 47(6):405–428, 2012), according to which affective experiences may be disembodied in the second language. I begin by briefly addressing the theoretical distinction between the embodied and disembodied views of cognition. Next, I review evidence from monolingual literature supporting the view that semantic and affective meaning are grounded in the perceptual, somatosensory, motor, and introspective experiences. Building on the Language and Situated Simulation hypothesis (Barsalou et al., Symbols and embodiment: debates on meaning and cognition, Oxford, pp. 245–283, 2008), I discuss the crucial role of the simulation system in the acquisition of affective meaning, and argue that its activation might be minimal for second language acquired in an instructed context. I support this claim with evidence from bilingualism and emotion research. I end this chapter with a word of caution by paying attention to numerous factors that may impact affective embodiment in bilinguals.