In this work we present an Intrusion Detection (ID) and an Intrusion Prevention (IP) model for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). The attacker’s goal is to compromise the deployment by causing nodes to report faulty sensory information. The defender, who is the WSN’s operator, aims to detect the presence of faulty sensor measurements (ID) and to subsequently recover compromised nodes (IP). In order to address the conflicting interests involved, we adopt a Game Theoretic approach that takes into consideration the strategies of both players and we attempt to identify the presence of Nash Equilibria in the two games. The results are then verified in two simulation contexts: Firstly, we evaluate the model in a middleware-based WSN which uses clustering over a bespoke network stack. Subsequently, we test the model in a simulated IPv6-based sensor deployment. According to the findings, the results of both simulation models confirm the results of the theoretic one.
CITATION STYLE
Maraslis, K., Spyridopoulos, T., Oikonomou, G., Tryfonas, T., & Haghighi, M. (2015). Application of a game theoretic approach in smart sensor data trustworthiness problems. In IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology (Vol. 455, pp. 601–615). Springer New York LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18467-8_40
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