This paper presents a formal, quantitative evaluation of the impact of bounded-rational security decision-making subject to limited information and externalities. We investigate a mixed economy of an individual rational expert and several naïve near-sighted agents. We further model three canonical types of negative externalities (weakest-link, best shot and total effort), and study the impact of two information regimes on the threat level agents are facing. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Grossklags, J., Johnson, B., & Christin, N. (2010). When information improves information security. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6052 LNCS, pp. 416–423). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_37
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