Abstract
The theory of fuzzy sets has been applied to social choice primarily in the contexts where one is given a set of individual fuzzy preference relations and the aim is to find a non-fuzzy choice set of winners or best alternatives. We discuss the problem of composing multi-member deliberative bodies starting from a set of individual fuzzy preference relations. We outline methods of aggregating these relations into a measure of how well each candidate represents each voter in terms of the latter's preferences. Our main goal is to show how the considerations discussed in the context of individual non-fuzzy complete and transitive preference relations can be extended into the domain of fuzzy preference relations. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Nurmi, H., & Kacprzyk, J. (2007). Designing representative bodies when the voter preferences are fuzzy. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4529 LNAI, pp. 211–219). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72950-1_22
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
