According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features (i.e., nomological necessitation and causal novelty) are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects of emergentism with this distinction in the background.
CITATION STYLE
Baysan, U. (2020). Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence. Erkenntnis, 85(4), 891–904. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0055-z
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