Democracy and diversionary incentives in Japan-South Korea disputes

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Abstract

Since its democratization, South Korea's foreign relations with Japan have become increasingly volatile. We investigate the diversionary incentives behind these fluctuations in South Korean foreign policy during 1988-2011. We show evidence that, similar to mature democracies, economic turmoil is driving Korean leaders to divert the public attention toward low-intensity disputes against Japan. However, unlike mature democracies, our results reveal that public approval ratings and national elections do not encourage leaders to engage in the diversionary behavior due to South Korean domestic political institutional settings and party system. These findings highlight challenges to foreign policy making in a new democracy, an issue that has not been considered in detail in the literature. We conclude that although historical antagonism and US commitment to East Asia may affect the Japan-South Korea relationship, economic diversionary incentives significantly determine the fluctuations in Japan-South Korea disputes. © The author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press in association with the Japan Association of International Relations; all rights reserved.

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APA

Kagotani, K., Kimura, K., & Weber, J. R. (2014). Democracy and diversionary incentives in Japan-South Korea disputes. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 14(1), 33–58. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct021

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