Cognitive Norms, Knowledge- Interests and the Constitution of the Scientific Object: A Case Study in the Functioning of Rules for Experimentation

Abstract

When the role of the scientist first became a focus of sociological analysis this social phenomenon was characterised by a particular set of norms: the well known Mertonian Norms of universality, communism (communality), disinterestedness, organized scepticism. From the very beginning, however, there could be no doubt that this conceptualization of the scientific community would not be appropriate to determine the fine structure of social organization in science. But even as a global concept of science as a profession it came under criticism. Subsequent authors (1) pointed to cases in which these norms were offended, while others, at most, conceded a historically limited validity to them (2). To be sure, the violation of a norm is no objection to its validity. But, within sociology, the unsanctioned violation is. For, in contrast to Ethics, the sociological concept of a norm is an empirical one: the ‘existence’ of a norm (3) sociologically depends on the fact that its offence is negatively sanctioned. From this point of view, Mulkay’s ‘Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in Natural Science’ (4) was a notable stroke against the claim for particular social norms of the scientific community. Taking the Velikovsky affair as an example Mulkay has shown to what degree the supposed Mertonian norms are offended, and what is more: are offended without punishment. But he did not end with this critique.