Measuring Impartial Beneficence: A Kantian Perspective on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale

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Abstract

To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, (Kahane et al., Psychological Review 125:131, 2018) developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian.

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APA

Mihailov, E. (2023). Measuring Impartial Beneficence: A Kantian Perspective on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 14(3), 989–1004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00600-2

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