Referential analysis of quotation

Abstract

A non-Fregean solution is offered to the problem of understanding the meaning of quotation statements. Quotations are analyzed by Frege in terms of a distinction that is judged unnecessary and counterintuitive, between customary and quoted indirect reference interpreted as customary sense. There are intuitive objections to Frege’s maneuver that are avoided in a proposed referential analysis in which quoting, like being taller than, is explained as a relation between two existent entities, a quoted subject and the exact linguistic type entity that the quoted subject is correctly quoted as articulating. The referential analysis is further extended to model four difficulties for standard neo-Fregean semantics, including (a) the use-mention distinction, (b) the intensionality-extensionality distinction, (c) the intensionality of syntax numbering contexts, and (d) criticism of Quine’s nine planets argument for the intensionality of alethic modal contexts.