Abstract
We study the quality of equilibrium in atomic splittable routing games. We show that in single-source single-sink games on series-parallel graphs, the price of collusion - the ratio of the total delay of atomic Nash equilibrium to the Wardrop equilibrium - is at most 1. This proves that the existing bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop equilibria carry over to atomic splittable routing games in this setting. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
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CITATION STYLE
Bhaskar, U., Fleischer, L., & Huang, C. C. (2010). The price of collusion in series-parallel networks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6080 LNCS, pp. 313–326). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13036-6_24
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