A dependable intrusion detection architecture based on agreement services

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the use of diversified COTS servers allows to detect intrusions corresponding to unknown attacks. We present an architecture that ensures both confidentiality and integrity at the COTS server level and we extend it to enhance availability. Replication techniques implemented on top of agreement services are used to avoid any single point of failure. On the one hand we assume that COTS servers are complex softwares that contain some vulnerabilities and thus may exhibit arbitrary behaviors. While on the other hand other basic components of the proposed architecture are simple enough to be exhaustively verified. That's why we assume that they can only suffer from crash failures. The whole system is assumed to be asynchronous and furthermore messages can be lost. In the particular case of Web servers connected to databases, we identify the properties that have to be maintained and the alarms that have to be raised. We describe in details how the different replicated levels interact together and, for each level, we precise the reasons that have led us to use a particular agreement service. Performance evaluations are conducted to measure the quality of service of the Intrusion Detection System (quantity of false positives and lack of false negatives) and the additional cost induced by the mechanisms used to ensure the availability of this secure architecture. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.