This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
CITATION STYLE
Azam, J. P. (2012). Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it. Public Choice, 153(3–4), 357–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9798-7
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