A Better Deal? Negotiated Responses to the Proceeds of Grand Corruption

Abstract

Judicially supervised negotiated settlements have featured heavily of late in discourse on responses to financial crimes committed by corporations. The United States has recently concluded a series of proceeds of kleptocracy settlements with individuals using processes which, from transparency and accountability perspectives, compare favourably to England’s asset recovery practice. This paper seeks to foster a conversation on whether the use of negotiated responses could or should be extended to arrangements with natural persons who are suspected of laundering the proceeds of grand corruption in England. It addresses some reservations that arise where negotiated responses to official corruption are employed and seeks to identify principled and practical justifications for the use of settlements instead of public civil recovery proceedings. It also draws on the US and English experiences in entering into settlements with companies for bribery offences in attempting to identify some of the main pitfalls and benefits implicit in utilising negotiated responses to corruption. The paper concludes by tentatively endorsing as an imperfect but pragmatic option the use of settlements as an alternative to existing asset recovery measures for corruptly-acquired assets.