E-Language and I-Language

Abstract

Chomsky claims that any theory of public “E-languages” will “surely have to presuppose grammars of I-languages.” Public languages are “more abstract” than I-languages, more “remote from mechanisms”. But can psychological mechanisms be described without reference (tacit or explicit) to social facts? I argue that public languages are indispensable to the study of language acquisition, as practiced by working psycholinguists. The data and explananda of acquisition theory are routinely couched in terms that make ineliminable reference to public languages, which serve as “targets” against which children’s successes and failures throughout development are measured. Though this does introduce a “normative-teleological” element into the science, it does not signal a move toward “prescriptive linguistics,” nor require an appeal to messy socio-political considerations. The normative-teleological element is innocuous, deriving from a theoretically motivated idealization of the child’s linguistic community. Next, I argue that the lack of precision in the individuation of public E-languages is just as much a feature of I-languages. Individuating I-languages requires settling unresolved issues about the competence/performance distinction, dialect mimicry, linguistic change, multilingualism, codeswitching, and cognitive disorders. It is not rational to insist on maximal precision in the individuation of either public E-languages or of I-languages at this stage of inquiry.