Success and Failure in Southern Africa: Peacekeeping in Namibia and Angola

Abstract

In April 1989, the United Nations sent the Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to Namibia to help that war-torn colony of South Africa become a peaceful, democratic and independent state. In June 1991, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) deployed to help monitor Angola’s transition from civil war to peace and democracy. The first mission was a huge success, one of several that bolstered the UN’s image as an organisation with an active role to play in the post-Cold War era. The second mission is, to date, an utter disaster. Angola has plunged back into a civil war even more brutal than that which preceded its short-lived peace. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PAGE 282 In April 1989, the United Nations sent the Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to Namibia to help that war-torn colony of South Africa become a peaceful, democratic and independent state. In June 1991, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) deployed to help monitor Angola's transition from civil war to peace and democracy. The first mission was a huge success, one of several that bolstered the UN's image as an organisation with an active role to play in the post-Cold War era. The second mission is, to date, an utter disaster. Angola has plunged back into a civil war even more brutal than that which preceded its short-lived peace. The dramatic difference between these, two peacekeeping operations is largely a matter of political will. In Namibia the parties involved wanted peace and were willing to compromise to achieve it. The losers in Namibia's first election respected the results and opposed the ruling party peacefully. In Angola, on the other hand, each side preferred winning a peaceful election to continuing the war, but the electoral losers preferred fighting to accepting their loss. If the parties involved do not want peace, there is little a UN peacekeeping operation can do to force it upon them. But the UN does affect the outcome, and in these two cases there were factors under UN control that contributed to success in one instance and failure in the other. In Namibia, the UN operation was set up in such a way that it was relatively costly (though certainly not impossible) for either party to renege on the peace deal. In Angola, in the interests of keeping the UN's costs down, the peacekeeping mission relied on the parties themselves to implement the peace accords. This made reneging on the agreement much easier. Demobilisation did not take place before elections were held, and the UN had little recourse to get the peace process back on track. PAGE 283 Peace requires cooperation, which is difficult to achieve because each side has incentives to renege and fears that the other will do so. UN peacekeepers can play two important roles to further cooperation. First, peacekeepers may raise the cost of reneging, and thus, decrease the incentive to break agreements, by focusing international attention and condemnation on any transgression.' Second, UN monitors can help prevent uncertainties about the intentions of the parties to abide by their agreements. In particular, monitoring can assure the parties that transgressions will be detected so that neither side will unwittingly continue to comply with an agreement that its opponent is breaking. This allows considerations of reciprocity to encourage compliance because each side realises it cannot get away with cheating - its own defection will prompt the other to retaliate. In Namibia the UN peacekeeping operation was strong enough to fulfil both these roles. In Angola it was not. NAMIBIA Background Namibia had been a problem for the UN from the founding of the organisation. South Africa was given authority to administer the territory, then known as South West Africa, under a League of Nations mandate at the end of the First World War. After the Second World War, South Africa refused to recognise the UN's authority as successor to the League and tried to annex Namibia. In the 1960s, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) began to fight for independence. Meanwhile, South Africa's attempt to extend apartheid laws to Namibia led the UN to revoke the mandate in 1966, and the International Court of Justice declared South Africa's occupation illegal in 1971. Civil war in Angola, Namibia's neighbour to the north, further complicated the conflict. SW APO guerillas operated out of Angolan territory and South Africa fought a bush war in Angola, against both SW APO and the Angolan army backed by Cuban troops. In 1976, the five Western nations then on the Security Council (Canada, France, Great Britain, the United States, and West Germany) formed the Contact Group to mediate an end to the conflict. The group proposed a settlement plan in 1978 which was endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 435 (1978).2 The plan called for free and fair elections of a Constituent