Abstract
In this paper, we develop a novel framework for resource advance reservation which is based on contingent pricing mechanism. We study the special case where each consumer has a computational demand, but at the time of request for capacity the consumer is uncertain whether or not this demand will occur. We proposed an incentive compatible mechanism where consumers have the incentive to reveal this private information. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Huang, Z., & Qiu, Y. (2005). Contingent pricing for resource advance reservation under capacity constraints. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3795 LNCS, pp. 761–766). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11590354_96
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