Supermodular games are a well known class of noncooperative games which find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications. Supermodular games always have Nash equilibria which are characterized as fixed points of multivalued functions on complete lattices. Abstract interpretation is here applied to set up an approximation framework for Nash equilibria of supermodular games. This is achieved by extending the theory of abstract interpretation in order to cope with approximations of multivalued functions and by providing some methods for abstracting supermodular games, thus obtaining approximate Nash equilibria which are shown to be correct within the abstract interpretation framework.
CITATION STYLE
Ranzato, F. (2016). Abstract interpretation of supermodular games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9837 LNCS, pp. 403–423). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53413-7_20
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