Social control of public expenditures in a multilevel principal-agent approach

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Abstract

This study enhances the principal-agent model by incorporating a multilevel perspective and differences among agency situations. A theoretical discussion is developed using a proposed intersection of methodological focuses and a descriptiveexemplificative hypothetical analysis. The analysis is applied to public expenditure social control in representative democracies, and as a result, a principal-agent model unfolds that incorporates a decision-making perspective and focuses on formulation, negotiation, articulation, and implementation competencies. Thus, it is possible to incorporate elements into the principal-agent model to make it more permeable to individual, group, and societal idiosyncrasies with respect to public expenditure social control.

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Pires, V., & Guimarães, A. S. (2015). Social control of public expenditures in a multilevel principal-agent approach. Revista de Economia Politica, 35(4), 878–894. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572015v35n04a11

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