This paper presents a lightweight anti-counterfeiting solution using intrinsic Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which are already embedded in most commodity hardware platforms. The presented solution is particularly suitable for low-end computing devices without on-board security features. Our anti-counterfeiting approach is based on extracting a unique fingerprint for individual devices exploiting inherent PUF characteristics from the on-chip static random-access memory (SRAM), which in turn allows to bind software to a particular hardware platform. Our solution does not require additional hardware, making it flexible as well as cost efficient. In a first step, we statistically analyze the characteristics of the intrinsic PUF instances found in two device types, both based on a widely used ARM Cortex-M microcontroller. We show that the quality of the PUF characteristics is almost ideal. Subsequently, we propose a security architecture to protect the platform's firmware by using a modified boot loader. In a proof of concept, we embed our solution on a state-of-the-art commodity system-on-a-chip platform equipped with an MCU similar to the ones previously analyzed. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.
CITATION STYLE
Schaller, A., Arul, T., Van Der Leest, V., & Katzenbeisser, S. (2014). Lightweight anti-counterfeiting solution for low-end commodity hardware using inherent PUFs. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8564 LNCS, pp. 83–100). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08593-7_6
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