Evolutionary Psychology and the Information-Processing Model of Cognition

Abstract

(from the chapter) Narrow evolutionary psychology represents an integration of two disciplines, evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology. However, its integrative potential has not been fully developed. My concerns focus on obstacles resulting from the particular information-processing (IP) model of cognition which dominates narrow evolutionary psychology. IP models as such need pose no difficulties for the progress of evolutionary psychology; however, the IP model which prevails in narrow evolutionary psychology is inspired by a functionalist theory of mind, and this construal brings serious complications with it. I argue that the immediate implications of this model make for a stark contrast with the inherently integrative aims of evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, the functionalist information-processing model of cognition drags with it all the baggage of the multiple realizability argument. I also argue that a further consequence of this approach is that it weakens the case some evolutionary psychologists have made in favor of a new, integrated causal model for the social sciences. Before turning to each of these difficulties, I will first discuss the place of the IP model in contemporary narrow evolutionary psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)