Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

Abstract

Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self-persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.