Digital verification techniques in the nuclear safeguards system: Status and perspectives

Abstract

The IAEA is interested in reducing its routine inspection effort at declared nuclear sites that are less sensitive. The approach taken is the concept of substituting on-site inspection effort by unattended and remote monitoring techniques with data evaluation at IAEA headquarters. This may not only improve the cost effectiveness of routine safeguards but will reduce the plant operators' escorting requirements as well as nuclear radiation exposure of IAEA and plant operators' staff. Another advantage may be acquiring safeguards data in a timely manner. The large variety of nuclear facilities to be safeguarded requires a great flexibility on the part of the IAEA in designing facility-specific safeguards instrumentation. The use of digital techniques (hardware, firmware, software) and modular hardware and software solutions for automated on-site instrumentation enables to design equipment systems integrating different sensor techniques such as cameras, radiation monitors, and seals. The two ESARDA Working Groups on Containment & Surveillance and on Techniques and Standards for Non Destructive Analysis (NDA) issued guidelines for developing unattended and remote monitoring and measurement systems. These guidelines will be subject to review and revision, as requirements and technologies change with progress. Unattended and remote monitoring systems techniques should have the following features: • data authentication at the sensor level, • front end data reduction including data compression and data correlation, • sufficient data storage capacity at the sensor level, • data encryption, • remote data transmission out of facilities to IAEA headquarters, • compatibility between devices of different origins, • integrated data review, • option for plant operator's performance of safeguards activities. A widely accepted compliance with these features may help to reduce procurement costs and training effort for inspectors and technicians, solve data security issues, and match different member states' development efforts. Three examples are given for existing or upcoming digital systems complying with the requirements of unattended operation, remote data transmission, and system integration: DCM 14-based camera systems and next generation surveillance systems NGSS, digital unattended multi-channel analyser DIUM, and electronic optical sealing system EOSS. The examples cover the IAEA's major monitoring principles, i.e., image surveillance, radiation monitoring, and electronic sealing. NGSS is only at the beginning of its development, DIUM is just about entering into its testing and evaluation phase, and EOSS has passed most of its testing and evaluation, but is still not authorised for inspection use. The presented equipment is designed for integration into systems with new functionality, including the correlation of image data with radiation data and electronic sealing. Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the future, it will be desirable to have available an appropriate generic review capability for integrated safeguards systems. Development efforts may start, once there will be sufficient achievement of harmonising and standardising the different categories of monitoring systems. © 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg.