Principals and agents in european democracy

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Abstract

European integration has progressed significantly and many analysts have commented that despite the expansion of EU competences, the democratization of the EU system has lagged behind. The debate on the European Union’s democratic deficit can be summarized through three major voices-Andrew Moravcsik, Giandomenico Majone and Simon Hix. Both Moravcsik and Majone deny the existence of a democratic deficit, while Hix adopts a more critical view, arguing that political contestation, a central characteristic of all democracies, is underdeveloped and lacking in the EU. Benjamin Spoerer undertakes a thorough analysis of the implications of principal-agent relations within the political structures and institutions in Europe. Approaching the question of the efficient provision of public goods and their democratic governance, this chapter shows that the principal-agent theory reveals weaknesses inherent in the different arguments of the debate on the democratic deficit. It becomes clear that distinct arguments and assumptions lead to mutual incomprehension, and thus create the current deadlock in discussions.

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Spörer, B. (2017). Principals and agents in european democracy. In The Governance of European Public Goods: Towards a Republican Paradigm of European Integration (pp. 117–165). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64012-9_5

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