This chapter develops a spatial model where an autocrat selects a status quo constitution which a succeeding elected constitutional assembly may or may not accept as a blue print for negotiations on constitutional reform. If the autocrat expects that the future constitutional assembly is dominated by parties which favor redistribution, he does not want to bind himself by the constitution. If the middle-class opposes redistribution or the middle class and the right dominate the constitutional assembly, stable constitutions exist which are in the interest of the autocrat. This framework is applied to transition processes in Chile and Egypt.
CITATION STYLE
Michalak, K., & Pech, G. (2013). Stable constitutions in political transition. In Advances in Political Economy: Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis (Vol. 9783642352393, pp. 67–89). Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_4
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